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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_______________ 
 
No. 14-3389 
________________ 
 
DWAYNE T. DIXON, 
                                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY UNITED STATES 
   DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-12-cv-03756) 
 
District Judge:  Honorable Cynthia M. Rufe 
_____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 19, 2015 
 
Before:  FUENTES, GREENAWAY, JR., and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: June 15, 2015) 
 
______________________ 
 
OPINION 
______________________ 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Appellant Dwayne Dixon brought a claim of constructive discharge against the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (the “VA”) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 621 (“ADEA”), claiming race and age discrimination.  Under Title VII and 
ADEA, a party complaining of adverse employment action must initiate contact with an 
Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) counselor within 45 days of the effective date 
of the personnel action or face dismissal by the agency.  29 C.F.R. §§ 1614.105(a)(1), 
1614.107(a)(2).  Dixon concedes that he missed the 45-day deadline, but argues that the 
timeframe should be equitably tolled.  The District Court rejected this argument at 
summary judgment.  We will affirm. 
I 
 Dixon is an African American male over the age of 40.  He began working for the 
VA on March 19, 2007.  Sometime in 2010, Dixon missed four days of work in a six 
month period because of periodontal (gum) disease and was disciplined.  He complained 
to the Equal Employment Officer about the discipline, but claims nothing was done.  On 
January 7, 2011, Dixon resigned from his position; he claims he was “constructively 
discharged . . . because of his race and age.”  App. at 31.  He also was diagnosed as 
having a major depressive disorder which he states was related to race and age 
discrimination and the hostile work environment at the VA. 
 Dixon did not contact an EEO counselor until November 25, 2011—over ten 
months after his resignation—and did not file his discrimination complaint with the VA 
until March 5, 2012.  Dixon claims the reason he did not initiate contact earlier was 
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because he was in “ill health, treating for various issues, to include major depressive 
disorder.”  App. at 42.  Despite these alleged health issues, Dixon was able to file a claim 
for unemployment compensation on January 9, 2011—two days after his resignation—
and appeared before the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review for a hearing on 
March 9, 2011. 
 The VA dismissed Dixon’s claims as untimely, stating, “As [Dixon] was able to 
pursue his unemployment case, we believe he could have pursued the EEO process in a 
timely manner.  Therefore, we have determined his explanation insufficient to waive the 
timelines.”  App. at 43.  The District Court granted summary judgment for the VA for the 
same reason.  Dixon also claimed that another reason he did not timely initiate contact 
with an EEO counselor was that he feared violence from his former coworkers.  The 
District Court rejected this argument, stating that Dixon “fail[ed] to explain how, once he 
no longer worked for the VA, such threats could act as a deterrent, especially as the 
nature of threats as described by [Dixon] related only to his work.”  App. at 8.  The 
District Court also noted, “Although [Dixon] alleged in his EEO Complaint that ‘[he] was 
threatened with physical violence by VA employees who were connected to upper 
management,’ he did not offer any evidence that the alleged threats extended to the 
period after his constructive discharge.”  Id.   
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
is plenary.  Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. Am. States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 
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(3d Cir. 1993).  Equitable tolling may be invoked “(1) where the defendant has actively 
misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in 
some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where 
the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.”  
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994).  Only 
the second basis could arguably apply in this case.  However, we agree with the District 
Court that Dixon’s ability to pursue his claim for unemployment compensation negates 
any argument that his health problems prevented him from timely contacting an EEO 
counselor about his race and age discrimination claims.  We also agree that Dixon’s 
claimed fear of physical violence does not seem to have prevented Dixon “in some 
extraordinary way” from initiating EEO contact.  Therefore, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment for the Appellee. 
 
